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TRIBUTE TO JUDGE MERHIGE
Orran L. Brown, Esq. *
I. INTRODUCTION
I clerked for Judge Merhige in 1981-82. That year, the Judge
embarked on something he had been considering for some time.
He decided to have one law clerk and to use his other clerk spot to
hire Jay Coulter, a former U.S. Marshal, to be his bailiff. Jay was
a dear man and a delightful, dedicated officemate. With one law
clerk and a full caseload, my stint as a law clerk was the hardest
year of my professional life, but also the most rewarding.
All of what I observed and learned during my year was enjoyed
and certainly can be commented upon by anyone who had the
privilege of serving the Judge-or serving the court, as he called
it-as his law clerk. I came to the court in the Judge's fifteenth
year on the bench. By then, he had long been a legend, having al-
ready issued many of his milestone rulings: ordering in 1970 the
University of Virginia to admit women; invalidating in 1971 a
Chesterfield County school policy that teachers could not work
past their fifth month of pregnancy; deciding forty-two school de-
segregation cases in 1970-72; ruling that General Electric Com-
pany must provide maternity leave benefits to its pregnant em-
ployees; presiding over trials of Native Americans accused of
crimes at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1976; fining Allied
Chemical Corporation in 1976 a record $13.2 million for Kepone
pollution; and resolving the Westinghouse uranium contract liti-
gation in 1979. We did not know it at the time, but his career on
the bench was not yet even at the half-way mark my clerkship
year.
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In 1981, the federal courthouse in Richmond housed the post
office, the Fourth Circuit, and the District Court Clerk and cham-
bers and courtrooms for Judge Merhige and Judge D. Dortch
Warriner. There were U.S. Marshals patrolling the courtrooms,
but no other security measures. You came in the front, went to
the elevator to the third floor, and walked directly into the
Judge's offices. It was a marvelous work setting-a beautiful,
dark wood panel historic courtroom, with the Judge's chambers
overlooking the State Capitol and grounds. Sitting in front of the
Judge's gas log fire, talking with him about the summary judg-
ment standard or how lucky we both were to be part of the noble
profession of the law, while the snow fell over the Capitol, was an
unforgettable treasure.
II. JUDGE MERHIGE'S JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
Much has been said of the Judge's work ethic. "There should be
no dark courtrooms" on any work day, he regularly said. He
scheduled trials every day during the week, often double or triple
booking different trials and hearings for the same day and time.
Because he was a master at finding the strengths and weak-
nesses in each party's case very quickly and in pointing them out
to the parties, many cases settled, and we usually won his docket
gamble. On several occasions, however, he ran two trials simul-
taneously, doing voir dire in his courtroom, giving those lawyers a
recess, darting over to the visiting judge's courtroom to begin jury
selection there, and then going back and forth to push both cases
along. He tended to his docket nearly 365 days a year. He ex-
pected his clerks to be at work by 7:30 each morning. Even when
I arrived earlier, the Judge was always there, having made coffee
for the office, greeting me with a hearty "Good afternoon!"
Judge Merhige had an unusually intuitive feel for the law. He
had an eerie ability to divine rapidly what the law was, or what it
should be, even before we researched existing precedents, and to
see far down the road to assess the impact of a particular ruling.
Each day I summarized for him the factual and legal issues in-
volved in the matters set for hearing or trial that day or the fol-
lowing day. He usually leaped ahead of me to what the correct re-
sult would be, remembering an existing ruling and telling me
where to find it, or predicting accurately what the law was on
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some issue he had never faced. The Judge wrote many opinions
himself in long hand, using a government-issue black felt pen on
a yellow legal pad. He also relied on his clerks to write drafts of
orders and opinions. Because we had no word processors, I gave
him my own handwritten drafts to read and review. His secretary
typed nothing until it was nearly finished.
The Judge's inner sense also gave him a keen capacity for un-
derstanding the needs, abilities, and strengths and weaknesses of
people of disparate backgrounds, education levels, and economic
conditions. Despite his stature, he identified with persons from
all walks of life and treated each with respect. They somehow
identified with him: court staff, janitorial staff, witnesses, crimi-
nal defendants, famous lawyers, young lawyers beginning their
careers, judges, jurors, and others who crossed his path. He en-
gendered in people an intense sense of dedication to him, espe-
cially among those of us who had the opportunity to work with
him every day. No person and no task was beneath him. He fre-
quently grabbed the phone when it rang before any of us could
reach it, answering with a cheerful "judge's office." Many times
the caller was a lawyer demanding an audience with Judge Mer-
hige or some other action by the court, who did not realize he was
speaking directly with the Judge. He took calls and visits from
the downtrodden, whose utilities had been disconnected, for ex-
ample, or who were suffering from other burdens. He usually
found a way to help them.
The Judge saw his role as one of serving the court and all those
who came through it. He went to great lengths to render service
to those who attempted to invoke the Court's power to provide a
remedy. Our year saw the mass exodus of refugees from Cuba in
the "freedom flotilla" of small boats crossing to Florida. One day
we received a petition, hand written in Spanish, from a person be-
ing held in a federal prison in our jurisdiction. With the help of a
Fourth Circuit assistant librarian, we translated the pleading,
which told the story of a man who had been imprisoned in Cuba
for taking a loaf of bread from a truck to feed his children. The
Judge's instincts told him the story was true. He entered an order
directing the U.S. Attorney to show cause why the person should
continue to be held. Within days, the government had released
the man to family members already living in the United States. It
was a sterling example of the breadth of his power and the proper
use of it.
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The Judge's desire to serve, work ethic, uncanny knack for see-
ing the proper result, and a sharp, quick mind combined to form a
remarkable jurist. He had the other qualities needed in a judge as
well. He was decisive ("sometimes wrong, but never in doubt," he
would say). He ruled promptly on objections, requests, and mo-
tions and moved things along. He ran his courtroom with crisp ef-
ficiency. He was demanding and a taskmaster, but never cruel. I
learned from him always to stand when addressing a court ("I
cannot hear you," he would say to a lawyer who spoke to him
while seated), and never to interrupt a judge, stray from the lec-
tern, place a briefcase on the court's table, bring in a newspaper,
or talk while a witness is being sworn. He knew when lawyers or
parties were avoiding the key question or fact and suffered no ob-
fuscation. He intimidated lawyers without being terrifying, yet
often showed his wit and sense of humor. When lawyers or wit-
nesses would stop speaking as the clock on his courtroom wall
chimed the hour, he would gesture to it and sigh, "some days that
is the only break we get." He would point to the bright sport coats
worn by his faithful court reporter, Gil Halasz, and refer to him
as his "band leader." When a lawyer would dare to interrupt him,
he would hold up his hand and say, "only at 5 Kanawha Road,"
meaning that he only allowed his family to do that. We heard
those comments and others like them many times, but somehow
every time they were funny.
The Judge was caring and nurturing to persons who needed
training or experience to master their tasks. He was particularly
sensitive to the emotions and development of young lawyers. He
would sit patiently as a nervous new lawyer, making his or her
first argument before him, tediously went through a written
presentation, and when it finally ended would thank the lawyer
for a "helpful" argument. On my very first day on the job, the two
departing clerks invited me to sit alone at the law clerk's table
during the middle of a late afternoon hearing, assuring me that
before the hearing ended they would be back and would handle
the duties of announcing the adjournment of the court and bang-
ing the session over. There was a script of several sentences that
I would later learn was read to open court and a different one to
adjourn, both of which had been in use for ages. Of course the
clerks had no intention of returning to help me, and I sat in hor-
ror as the hearing wound down and they were nowhere to be
seen. The Judge finished the matter and turned to me with the
direction to "adjourn the court." I had no idea what to say, as I
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stood up, and all eyes in the courtroom fell upon me. I blurted
"This court shall stand adjourned!" and slammed the gavel on the
table. With a twinkle in his eye, the Judge looked to me, and then
to the startled lawyers at the tables, and asked: "Is that the way
we do things around here?" He quickly added: "I guess it is now."
It was his way of being in on the joke on the new guy, but at the
same time reassuring me that everything would be alright.
Judge Merhige's expectations of the lawyers who appeared be-
fore him escalated with his estimation of your abilities and poten-
tial. He was most exacting of those he felt would handle his hard
questioning and schedule. When I returned to Richmond in 1986
after four years of practice in Houston, I regularly appeared be-
fore Judge Merhige in hearings and trials, standing at the lectern
where I had watched many others perform, and observing the
formalities of the courtroom in which I had once roamed freely. I
found each of these sessions to be a constant struggle not to dis-
appoint him and to show him that his faith in me had not been
misplaced. I could tell when he seemed pleased that I had done
my best and felt the hurt he seemed to feel when my performance
was substandard.
III. THE DALKON SHIELD LITIGATION
In late 1989, I began serving as outside counsel to the Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust, the $2.23 billion facility created in the A.
H. Robins bankruptcy to process the 400,000 claims arising from
the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. In that role, I had almost-
weekly hearings with Judge Merhige, and often Bankruptcy
Judge Blackwell N. Shelley, and reported to the Judge in cham-
bers on the progress of Trust matters frequently. It was a rare
experience that the Judge himself had helped make possible, for
he was involved in suggesting to the Trustees to engage me and
my then partner, Michael Smith, as counsel to the Trust.
The Sixth Amendment and Restated Plan of Reorganization of
the A. H. Robins Company approved by Judge Merhige and Judge
Shelley in In re A.H. Robins Co.,1 capped a long struggle by
1. 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
959 (1989).
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Judges Merhige and Shelley, the lawyers for the A.H. Robins Co.,
its commercial creditors, the personal injury claimants who had
used the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, the company's share-
holders and employees, and many other affected parties to devise
a solution to the staggering potential Dalkon Shield liability that
had driven the company into a Chapter 11 reorganization pro-
ceeding on August 21, 1985. With the outline of a claims admini-
stration procedure hashed out by the parties and approved by the
Courts in the "Claims Resolution Facility" ("the CRF") attached
as Exhibit C to the Plan, and funding assured by the $2.255 bil-
lion provided by the American Home Products Corporation for its
acquisition of the Robins assets, the lawyers and parties rejoiced
over what was promised to be the "global peace" secured by the
end to litigation and the transfer of Dalkon Shield-related liabil-
ity from Robins to the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, the entity
created under the Plan to receive the $2.255 billion corpus and
dispose of the nearly 400,000 personal injury claims noted by
claimants during the course of the bankruptcy proceeding. When
all appeals were concluded with the affirmance of the Plan and
the Claimants Trust was fully funded on December 15, 1989, the
collective sigh of relief resulting from this milestone was quite de-
served.
In reality, the Plan was not the end of the Dalkon Shield prob-
lem. Implementing the claims process within the contours negoti-
ated by the parties and approved by the courts in the Plan and its
accompanying CRF would demand tremendous energy, creativity,
and perseverance by Judge Merhige and Judge Shelley, who had
witnessed and facilitated its creation, judges of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, the Trust and its Trustees, employ-
ees, and lawyers, and the nearly countless claimants and their
counsel involved in this massive enterprise. Some twelve years
after their approval of the Plan, the Trust closed, after distribut-
ing over $2.96 billion-more than its original funding-to Dalkon
Shield claimants.
From the beginning of the Robins bankruptcy until his retire-
ment, Judge Merhige led the parties through the multiple issues
and obstacles presented by the size and complexity of the under-
taking. The success of the Plan is a tribute to his ingenuity, en-
ergy, and foresight, without which the story certainly would have
proceeded far differently.
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In the course of the implementation of the Robins Plan, Judge
Merhige presided over countless hearings, received reports from
the Trust's director and counsel on the progress of the three
trusts created to handle all Dalkon-related claims almost daily,
and issued over 150 opinions on various issues of interpreting the
Plan and review of the Trustees' actions on claims. He often found
himself operating in uncharted waters, creating law on issues
that affected thousands of claims and would be used in other
mass tort settings. As he did throughout his career on the bench,
he strove to follow the law and reach results that best served the
parties' interests, both near-term and for the future, regardless of
the public perception of his actions. In this space, I can provide
only one example of a bold step he took to enhance the recovery of
Dalkon Shield claimants.
Section G. 14 of the CRF in the Robins Plan provided that if the
Trust had funds remaining after satisfying or providing for the
initial payments on eligible claims, it was to distribute this resid-
ual to claimants who had been previously paid, on a pro rata ba-
sis. In 1995, as the Trust approached its first pro rata distribu-
tion of additional funds, Judge Merhige entered an order
disallowing attorneys fees of claimants counsel in excess of ten
percent of the pro rata distribution.2 The Judge exercised his in-
herent power to limit attorneys fees to a reasonable amount and
concluded that more than ten percent fees on these additional
payments, after the attorneys had received their full fees from the
claimants' original awards, would be unreasonable. The ruling,
which prompted outrage from many claimants' counsel and re-
sulted in protracted proceedings on challenges to the limit, meant
that far more of the over $1.5 billion distributed as pro rata pay-
ments went to the Trust's beneficiaries. The precedent is used of-
ten in these mass claims settings to regulate permissible fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton made the case for an
independent federal judiciary comprised of individuals with life
tenure, "as the citadel of the public justice and the public secu-
2. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 182 B.R. 128 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd, 86 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 993 (1996).
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rity."3 As one ground for this permanence of the position, he
wrote:
It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that a volu-
minous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily con-
nected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an arbi-
trary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them;
and it will readily be conceived from the variety of controversies
which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the re-
cords of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very consider-
able bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a
competent knowledge of them. Hence it is, that there can be but few
men in the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify
them for the stations of judges. And making the proper deductions
for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be
still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the req-
uisite knowledge. These considerations apprise us, that the govern-
ment can have no great option between fit character; and that a
temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage such
characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat
on the bench, would have a tendency to throw the administration of
justice into hands less able, and less well qualified, to conduct it with
utility and dignity.
4
Judge Merhige embodied the traits that Hamilton sought in
our federal judges. He was among the men and women of the
requisite integrity and the requisite knowledge who can serve as
the "faithful guardians" of the Cohstitution and of individual lib-
erty. He served that role with utility and dignity until his retire-
ment from the bench in 1998. Until his passing, he served the
role as mentor, leader, and paternal figure to all of us whom he
included in his extended law clerk family. Not a day goes by with-
out me thinking of him in some way.
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
4. Id.
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